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No. 15480 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants' statement of facts takes two quotes out of 
context and ignores unfavorable findings of fact made by the 
court, which are supported by the evidence. 
In this action plaintiffs, as contract buyers of unim-
proved land, seek to recover damages they incurred because of 
failure of the developers of the area to install streets and 
utilities. One of the developers, from whom plaintiffs bought, 
agreed that the improvements would be installed and the other 
developers gave an indenture and a bond to the county guaran-
teeing their installation (Ex. 8P). 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Time For Performance 
Under the indenture furnished,the improvements were to be 
installed two years from the recordine of the final plat. It 
made no provision whatseover for any extension of time for per-
formance. The quote on Page 3 of appellants' brief combines 
wording from the indenture and from the bond securing same. 
In the language of the bond there is the provision that the 
surety consents to any modifications of the contract which may 
be agreed upon, including any extensions of time, but that is 
merely usual suretyship language which permits principals to 
change the agreement without going back to the surety for its 
consent. The time for performance of the indenture is clear 
and fixed. It was two years after the recording of the plat. 
The court found that the final plat was recorded February 2, 
1970 and that "the time for performance of the obligation to 
install improvements ... has expired." (Finding No. 4, Tr. 123) 
Appellants assert that they are not in default because the bond 
was not "called." Appellants are erroneously treating the 
indenture as if it were an agreement to do something upon de-
mand, which it is not. 
Appellants then take exactly the opposite tack and state 
that more than two years had passed prior to the time plain-
tiffs' Uniform Real Estate Contract was executed, thereby 
implying that the time for performance of the indenture had 
expired prior to the time plaintiffs acquired any rights. In 
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so stating appellants ignore the fact that the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract was an outgrowth of the original obligation evi-
denced by an earnest money agreement whereby plaintiffs had 
agreed to purchase the lots. Said earnest money agreement was 
dated December 29, 1971, prior to the expiration of the two-year 
period. Appellants also ignore Finding No.11 (Tr.124) which 
states: 
On December 29, 1971, the date plaintiffs 
entered into the earnest money agreement 
whereby they purchased the lots, the time 
for performance under the performance bond 
had not expired. 
Appellants As Developers 
Appellants state that they were in no way involved "with 
the plaintiffs' land vendor." There is no finding to that effect. 
The evidence is to the contrary (Tr.167,168). Furthermore, the 
obvious utlimate fact is that appellants must have been involved 
with the land developers or they would not have guaranteed the 
installation of the improvements. 
Prior Liens 
Appellants state that the developers had placed liens 
against the entire subdivision, that plaintiffs' interests have 
been foreclosed and that plaintiffs made no attempt to obtain 
releases of their land from these liens. Appellants ignore 
Finding of Fact No.15 (Tr.124) which states: 
Defendants have abandoned their plans to 
develop the subdivision and to install the 
improvements. Plaintiffs could have pro-
tected their ownership interests as contract 
buyers against the lien created by Exhibit 6P, 
and would have done so had the lots had suffi-
cient value. The failure to install improve-
ments caused the lots to have insufficient 
-3-
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value to warrant further investment 
of funds by plaintiffs, and further 
investments would have been uneconomic. 
The abandonment of the subdivision by 
defendants caused plaintiffs to lose 
interest in their contract and to lose 
title to the lots. Plaintiffs' damage 
accrued prior to the time they determined 
not to make further investments in the 
lots and thereby lost title thereto. 
Plaintiffs minimized their losses by not 
making any further investment. 
Impossibility of Performance 
Appellants state that the planned development has now been 
entirely changed and that it would now be impossible to install 
the improvements, and imply that this insulates appellants 
from damages. Such ultimate conclusions are fallacious for 
the following reasons. 
1. It might be difficult but not "impossible'' 
to install improvements even though it 
might involve obtaining consent of the new 
owner. 
2. The fact that there is a new owner is a 
direct result of the failure of the devel-
opers to perform under the indenture and 
bond. 
3. Plaintiffs are not seeking specific per-
formance so present inability to perform 
is immaterial. 
A R G U M E N T 
Plaintiffs are Third-Party Beneficiaries 
Travelers contends (p.7) that the indenture and bond, 
pursuant to which plaintiffs were awarded judgment, should 
have been construed as being for the benefit of the county only 
and not for the benefit of interested property owners. 
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Travelers cites Schwingharrnner v. Alexander (1968), 21 U.2d 418, 
446 P.2d 414, as authority therefor. That case factually has 
no relationship to the case at bar. It involved an escrow 
agreement wherein the lender, Prudential Federal Savings, 
received for its own protection a deposit to assure completion 
of a home. The holding of the case was that Prudential had no 
intent to benefit the home owner as a third party and that the 
lender, Prudential Federal Savings, was not liable to the 
owner for allegedly improperly paying the escrowed funds to 
the contractor. We agree with the statement of law contained 
therein, that those third parties who are only incidentally 
benefited without any intention of the promisee that they 
should have rights, are incidental beneficiaries and cannot 
sue; but applying the classifications therein stated, plain-
tiffs here are "donee beneficiaries," not "incidental benefi-
ciaries." 
Travelers argues that there is no evidence that Summit 
County intended that plaintiffs should be third-party benefi-
ciaries. The evidence before the trial court consisted of the 
indenture and bond (Ex. 8P) and Ordinance No. 58 of Summit 
County (Ex. 9P) . 
Ordinance No. 58 under which the bond was required 
contemplates that the landowners shall be the beneficiaries 
of the requirements relating to the improvements. The ordi-
nance provides: 
Whenever the subdivider develops a subdi-
vision a portion at a time, such development 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
shall be in an orderly manner and in such 
a way that the required improvements will 
be continuous and all of the said im-
¥rovements will be made available fo:r-the 
ull effective and practical use and 
enjoyment thereof £1. the lessees or 
rantees of an of the lands subdivided 
wit in t e time erein e ore speci ie . 
Sec. 7B2 
The ordinance also reflects that prospective purchasers 
are being protected in that it requires notice to purchasers 
of sulillller home subdivision lots that the usual requirements 
for subdivisions relating to streets and water have been waived. 
The ordinance provides: 
For Sulillller Home Subdivisions that are sub-
mitted in accordance with the Summer Home 
Subdivision provisions of these regulations 
the following statement shall be required 
on the final plat; i.e., 
Notice to Purchaser of Summer Home 
Subdivision Lots: 
This subdivision has been approved in 
accordance with the Summer Home Subdi-
vision provisions of the Subdivision 
Regulations of Summit County which 
waive the requirements for the provi-
sion of a dedicated public street and 
reduce the requirements for an approved 
water supply system to State Board of 
Health Summer Home Standards for such 
Water Supply System. 
Sec. 5C2 
The ordinance further reflects that prospective purchasers 
are being protected in that it prohibits sale of lots until 
after compliance with its requirements. 
No street improvements or utilities shall be 
installed until after approval of the final 
-6-
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plat by the County Surveyor or Engineer. 
No lots included in such plat shall be 
purchased, sold, exchanged, nor offered 
for sale or exchange and no construction 
of ~uilding~ upon such lots shall begin 
until the final plat is so approved and 
recorded. 
Sec. 5E2 
The wording of the indenture and bond is consistent with 
the obvious objective, which is to guarantee interested parties, 
including landowners, that the improvements will be put in. 
The indenture states: 
Principals hereby agree to cause the 
various improvements ... to be installed 
on or before two (2) years from recorda-
tion of the final plats. 
The bond recites that it is guaranteeing that principals 
"will install said improvements." (Ex. 8P) 
The trial court made Finding of Fact No. 5 (Tr. 123): 
Plaintiffs, as purchasers of lots in said 
subdivision, are beneficiaries of the 
indemnity and performance bond. Said bond 
was intended for the benefit of purchasers 
of said lots. 
The finding of fact not only is not erroneous, but also 
is controlling upon this court since this is an action at law 
for damages. 
Travelers argues that it should not be liable because 
plaintiffs could recover against their seller. This is a 
non sequitur. Both are liable, but Travelers is solvent. 
Travelers argues (p.10) that Summit County is the only 
proper party plaintiff on the bond and cites four California 
-7-
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cases in support thereof. 1 Three of these cases involve a 
California statute requiring that a bond be furnished. The 
California courts properly looked at not only the wording of 
the bond, but at the statute requiring the bond in determining 
whether or not anyone other than the county was an intended 
third-party beneficiary. They all concluded that because of 
the wording of the statute and bond there was no intent that 
the land owners should have a direct cause of action as a 
third-party beneficiary. The Morro language, which Travelers 
quotes, shows that California was determining intent: 
It is the county which is indemnified 
by the express terms of the bond against 
loss from 'all cost and damage which ... 
it may suffer' from Westfall's default 
either in building the roads or in fail-
ing to 'fully reimburse and to repay the ... 
county all outlay and e({'ense which ... it 
may incur in making goo any ... default.,.-
(emphasis added) 
We have no quarrel with the result of the California cases 
considering the wording of the statute and bonds which they 
were construing. The case at bar is construing language in the 
bond and ordinance, both of which, when construed together, 
indicate that a third-party beneficiary is intended to be 
benefited. 
1 Evola v. Wendt Construction Co. (1959), 17 C.A.2d 21, P.2d 498; 
Ragghiajti v. ~ (1961) ' 16 Cal. Rptr. 538; 
M:>rro Palisades . v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. (1959) 
52 C.2d 397, 340 P.2d 628 
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In the Morro case the reference to recovery by a third-
party beneficiary was only an incidental part of the decision, 
inasmuch as the county had actually assigned its right to the 
plaintiff. The court held that the county could not do so, and 
that one of the landowners should not be in the position of 
recovering for all damage arising out of failure to perform. 
Morro was attempting to recover the entire costs of the improve-
ments for himself personally. Plaintiffs here seek to recover 
only their own damages. 
The Evola case held that inasmuch as the ordinance requir-
ing the furnishing of a bond required a performance bond instead 
of a payment bond, an unpaid supplier was not intended as a 
third-party beneficiary. Such reasoning implies that, had a 
payment bond been required, the materialmen could have recovered. 
The Ra~anti. case follows the Evola case, with the same 
reasoning. 
A fourth California case 2 cited by Travelers was decided, 
not upon the basis that a third-party beneficiary had no right 
to sue, but rather upon the basis that a condition precedent 
had not been met, so that there was no liability under the bond 
to anyone. 
Travelers argues (p.13) that Summit County has not "called 
for the improvements to be made" and that therefore Travelers 
should not be liable. The bond expressly provides that ir;iprovements 
2 City of Los Angeles v. M=line (1936) 14 C.A. 522, 58 P.2d 690 
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should be completed by a given date and the court expressly 
found that the improvements had not been put in and that there 
was a default. (Findings 3, 4, 6, 8; Tr. 12 3) When a party 
has agreed to perform by a given date no demand is necessary. 
(Bjork v. April Industries (1976) U.2d , 547 P.2d 219) 
Travelers argues (p.13) that Summit County has not assiB!led 
any of its rights to plaintiffs and that therefore plaintiffs 
should not recover. The whole concept of a third-party benefi-
ciary's right to sue assumes that there is no assignment. 
Travelers cites a Missouri case. 3 That case involved a 
bond guaranteeing the installation of a sewer system. The 
court there held that the bonding company was not liable in 
tort to the landowner for the washing away of his property when 
the sewer system was not installed. The basis of the decision 
was that the language of the ordinance and the bond indicated 
that the bond was not intended to cover the tort, particularly 
inasmuch as the language expressly stated that the city council 
could resort to the bond to complete the improvements. The 
court recognized that had the ordinance and bond reflected an 
intent to benefit third-party beneficiaries, their rights would 
be recognized. 
The Uew York supplement case cited by appellant 4 merely 
held that from the language of the bond it was apparent 
3 
4 
City of Universi!:t City v. Frank Miceli & Sons R & B Co. Cit>. 1961) 
347 s.w.2<r31 
J & J Tile Co., Inc. v. Feinstein (1973) 348 N.Y.S.2d 783 Sp.Ct., 
App. Div. 
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that there was no attempt to benefit materialmen and that they 
were therefore not proper third-party plaintiffs. 
Travelers argues (p.14) that the bond does not specifi-
cally provide that third parties may recover. Among the many 
cases that recognize that there need be no specific reference 
to the right of a third party in order for it to be a third-
party beneficiary entitled to recover are Walker Bank & Trust 
Co. v. First Security Corporation, 9 U2d 215, 341 P.2d 944, 946 
in which First Security was held liable to children who sued 
as third-party beneficiaries under First Security's agreement 
with the mother of the children, that it would pay premiums 
upon her life insurance. The life insurance had lapsed, prior 
to her death, because of the default of First Security. The 
court said that First Security's "failure to do so renders it 
liable to the beneficiaries who were harmed thereby despite 
lack of privity between them." 
Another Utah case so holding, and quite similar factually 
to the case at bar, is Deluxe Glass Co. v. Martin, 116 U. 144, 
208 P.2d 1127,1132. In that case it was held that materialmen 
were protected by a performance bond and could recover as third-
party beneficiaries. The position of the bonding company was 
that inasmuch as the bond furnished was a performance bond 
rather than a payment bond, guaranteeing payment to the material-
men, the materialJren could not recover as third-party benefi-
ciaries. The court there determined, considering the bond, the 
statute requiring same, the contract and the cotmnon law, that 
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"circuity" of having the promisee sue the surety and then 
having the promisee protect the owner was to be avoided, and 
that the materialmen were third-party beneficiaries and could 
sue the surety even though not referred to in the bond. This 
court stated: 
It is not always quite clear what is meant 
when the courts say that the 'intention' of 
the parties is controlling. There does not 
seem to be any basis for holding that, al-
though a performance of the contract will 
necessarily and directly benefit the third 
person, his remedy depends upon an inten-
tion on the part of the parties to the con-
tract that he shall have the right to sue 
thereon. While the intention of the parties 
controls in the creation of rights under the 
contract, and in determining the things 
required by the contract to be done by the 
parties, it would seem that, once the right 
is created or the duty is imposed in favor 
of the third person, the law furnishes the 
remedy, regardless of the intention of the 
parties in respect thereof. 
It is to be borne in mind that the parties 
are presumed to intend the consequences of 
a performance of the contract. That which 
is contemplated by the terms of the contract 
is 'intended' by the parties. 'The distinc-
tion between the motive which leads a person 
to enter into a contract, and the intention 
deducible from the terms of the contract as 
it is written, is a very clear one.' ... 
(citing cases). 
Clearly, the bond in this case was 'intended' 
to directly benefit the materialmen, as that 
expression is above defined. They, there-
fore, are entitled to maintain this action. 
These two Utah cases are in accord with the majority of 
decisions as reflected by the following authorities and with 
Rule 17(a). 
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Rule 17(a) provides in part "every action shall be prose-
cuted in the name of the real party in interest." Plaintiffs 
are the real parties in interest. 
The general rule which permits a third 
person for whose benefit a contract is 
made to enforce the contract enables a 
person not named in the bond, but for 
whose benefit the bond was given to bring 
an action to enforce rights under the 
bond. (12 AmJur 2d, Bonds Par. 39) 
Where such a bond in its entirety! is con-
sistent with an intention that a third 
party and others in a like position should 
have the right to sue thereon, that right 
will be enforced. (11 CJS Bonds Par. 106) 
As a general rule ... although the state is 
the only one named as obligee and there is 
no express provision giving ti1ird persons 
rights thereunder, and notwithstanding the 
absence of privity of contract between the 
principal contractor and such persons ... 
such persons may sue on the bond. 
(81 CJS States, Par. 119) 
In a proper case a third person, for whose 
benefit or protection a contract has been 
made by a municipal corporation with a 
private corporation or company, may main-
tain an action thereunder in his own name. 
Under this rule a recovery of damages has 
been allowed and sustained in favor of: 
An abutting landowner ... 
(63 CJS Municipal Corporations, Par. 1026) 
... the action should be brought in the 
name of the real party in interest. Neither 
the county nor the commissioners thereof ... 
are necessary parties to an action ... against 
the surety. (20 CJS Counties, Par. 205) 
Some authorities have even gone so far as to hold that the named 
obligee cannot sue and that "the loss or burden falls upon the 
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property owners, and the municipality cannot recover therefor, 
either as trustee for them or on its own account, upon the bond 
of the contractor." (17Am.Jur.2d, Contractors; Bonds, Par. 125) 
Travelers cites a lower court Connecticut decision. 5 All 
that case held was that as a matter of suretyship law, a bond-
ing company cannot be liable if there is no showing that the 
principal is liable. That situation does not exist in the case 
at bar since the lower court found all principals and their 
surety liable and expressly found that time for performance had 
expired. (Findings, Nos. 3, 4, 6, and 8; Tr. 123) As stated 
above, there need not be a "call" for the principals and the 
surety to be liable for their breach of obligation to perform 
by a stated date. (supra p. 10) 
Travelers states (p.15 and 16) that there has been an 
extension of time for performance. There is no evidence there-
of and such a contention is in direct contradiction of Findings, 
Nos. 3, 4, 6 and 8. (Tr. 123) 
Damages 
Travelers complains (p.18) that the award of $7,200 plus 
interest was not supported by the evidence, arguing that the 
$7,200 paid did not coincide with Fleck's testimony as to the 
$8,750 value of the land without the agreed improvements. Those 
are not comparable figures. Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty 
Dollars, being the residual value of the land, would never be 
5 Star Contracting Corp. v. Manwa~ Construction Co .• Inc. (1973) 
32 conn.supp. 64, 337 A.z 669 
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an ultimate damage amount, but rather, would only be a factor 
in computing the amount of damage. The $8,750 sould be deducted 
from the value of the property had the improvements been put in, 
which was $70,000 (two dollars a foot for 35,000 square feet) 
(Tr.153). By subtracting the residual value of $8,750 from 
$70,000, damages would be in the amount of $61,250. The court 
awarded only that portion thereof which was reflected by the 
out-of-pocket payments made by plaintiffs ($7,200 plus interest). 
Travelers can hardly complain that the court recognized only a 
portion of the damages to which one of the plaintiffs testified. 
Travelers then argues (p.19) that there was no testimony 
relating to the $7,200 actually paid out of pocket by plaintiffs. 
Exhibits lOP and llP show said payments and, based thereon, the 
court found in Finding No.7 (Tr.123) that said payments had been 
made. In Finding No.9 (Tr.123) the court found that plaintiffs 
suffered damage in the amount of $7,200 plus interest. Such 
findings, being supported by the evidence, are binding upon this 
court. 
Travelers next argues (p.19) that since the property without 
improvements is worth $8,750; since plaintiffs paid only $7,200 
of the $36,000 called for by the contract of purchase; since the 
sellers agreed that until the bond improvements were put in the 
remaining balance of the purchase price need not be paid, plain-
tiffs therefore suffered no damage. This illogical conclusion 
arises from Travelers' ignoring the fact that since the improve-
ments were not put in, the land was not worth saving. Since 
the $8, 750 present value was much less than the remaining $28,800 
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balance of the contract price and much less than the outstanding 
liens, the plaintiffs minimized their losses by not making any 
further investment to either pay off the remaining balance of 
the contract or to discharge existing liens. As the court found, 
Defendants have abandoned their plans to 
develop the subdivision and to install the 
improvements. Plaintiffs could have pro-
tected their ownership interests as contract 
buyers against the lien created by Exhibit 6P 
and would have done so had the lots had 
sufficient value. The failure to install 
improvements caused the lots to have insuf-
ficient value to warrant further investment of 
funds by plaintiffs, and further investments 
would have been uneconomic. The abandonment 
of the subdivision by defendants caused 
plaintiffs to lose interest in their contract 
and to lose title to the lots. Plaintiffs' 
damage acrued prior to the time they deter-
mined not to make further investments in the 
lots and thereby lost title thereto. Plain-
tiffs minimized their losses by not making 
any further investment. (Finding No.15) 
Travelers argues (p.20) that there is no evidence relating 
to the cost of improvements and cites the Morro case as author-
ity that decrease in value of property is not the proper 
measure of damages. As pointed out above, the bond in the 
Morro case specifically provided that the bond should be used 
to "fully reimburse and repay the county ... outlay and expense 
which it may incur in making good any default." The indenture 
in the case at bar did not provide that the county should be 
reimbursed for its expenses in installing the improvements in 
case of default, but merely stated: 
Principals hereby agree to cause the various 
improvements ... to be installed on or before 
two years from recordation of the said final 
plat. 
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The factual differences make the Morro case unpersuasive here. 
Plaintiffs' Damages Resulted From Defendants' Failure to 
Install Improvements 
Travelers recites (p.21) that plaintiffs were only contract 
purchasers and thus only equitable owners, and that they knew of 
the existance of prior liens, and that the plaintiffs lost their 
interest in the land by virtue of the foreclosures of the prior 
liens. With all of this we agree. Travelers ignores, however, 
the Finding of Fact, No. 15 (Tr.124) quoted above, finding that 
the reason that title was lost was that defendants having de-
faulted, the land was not worth protecting and plaintiffs mini-
mized their losses by not making further investments. Travelers' 
argument that plaintiffs were only contract purchasers seems 
irrelevant. Travelers' argument that "The lack of improvements 
did not cause plaintiff's loss--the trust deed sale did" is con-
trary to the finding of the court in Finding 15 that "the failure 
to install improvements caused the lots to have insufficient 
value to warrant further investment and further investments would 
have been uneconomic. The abandonment of the subdivision by 
defendants caused plaintiffs to lose interest in their contract 
and to lose title to the lots." Those findings are controlling 
here. 
Travelers recites (p.22) that "notice of default was on 
the record prior to (plaintiffs) recording their purchase con-
tract." The notice of default was not of record, however, prior 
to the plaintiff's entering into the earnest money agreement in 
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1971 (Finding No. 11, Tr.124), nor was it of record prior to 
plaintiffs' paying $7,200. 
"Impossibility" Is No Defense (Specific Performance is Not Sought) 
Travelers states (p.23) that the whole subdivision as 
planned and bonded has now been changed so that it is now im-
possible to make the improvements· that Travelers guaranteed 
would be installed and that, furthermore, there is a new owner 
who might not permit Travelers to enter to install the improve-
ments. Travelers concludes therefrom that this somehow excuses 
it from breach of its guarantee that the improvements would 
have been installed by 1972. 
We reiterate that the findings are to the effect that had 
Travelers and its principals performed as agreed there would 
have been no change of title and, therefore, no "impossibility." 
Present impossibility, if it is indeed "impossible," is 
hardly a tenable defense to be relied upon by the bonding com-
pany which guaranteed that improvements would have been installed 
long before. It is actually irrevelant whether or not improvements 
can now be installed because no one is seeking specific perfor-
mance, but rather damages. 
The Oklaho~a caseG cited by Travelers on impossibility as 
a defense held that a railroad, which had entered ir.to a lease 
6 Kansas, Oklahana & Gulf Railway Co. v. Grandland Grain Co. (Okl.1967) 
- 434 P.Zd 153 
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which provided that the railroad would, during the term of the 
lease, transport lessee's grain, was excused from future per-
formance by virtue of the condemnation of the line for a dam 
site. This is hardly authority for excusing failure to perform 
prior to the impossibility. 
The U.S. Supreme Court case cited as to impossibility7 is 
likewise no authority for excusing a breach of contract prior 
to the existence of the impossibility. In that case there was 
a charter party for use of a ship which was requisitioned by 
the British Admiralty for use in World War I. The court merely 
held that future performance was excused. 
C 0 U C L U S I 0 N 
Travelers seeks to avoid liability on a bond it issued, 
guaranteeing that improvements would be installed,on the various 
technical grounds discussed above and argues that plaintiffs 
should look to their defunct seller instead of to Travelers. 
They are both liable. Travelers received its premium for 
executing the bond and should not now avoid the liability it 
assumed. 
~u7d __ ,,_' _,__~) 
; John W. Lowe 
, Lowe & Hurley 
/ Attorney for Respondents 
7 Texas Co. v. Hogarth Shippir}g Co. Ltd. (1921) 41 S.Ct. 612, 256 U.S. 619 
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